A threat actor known as Stargazer Goblin has set up a network of inauthentic GitHub accounts to fuel a Distribution-as-a-Service (DaaS) that propagates a variety of information-stealing malware and netting them $100,000 in illicit profits over the past year.
The network, which comprises over 3,000 accounts on the cloud-based code hosting platform, spans thousands of repositories that are used to share malicious links or malware, per Check Point, which has dubbed it “Stargazers Ghost Network.”
Some of the malware families propagated using this method include Atlantida Stealer, Rhadamanthys, RisePro, Lumma Stealer, and RedLine, with the bogus accounts also engaged in starring, forking, watching, and subscribing to malicious repositories to give them a veneer of legitimacy.
The network is believed to have been active since August 2022 in some preliminary form, although an advertisement for the DaaS wasn’t spotted in the dark until early July 2023.
“Threat actors now operate a network of ‘Ghost’ accounts that distribute malware via malicious links on their repositories and encrypted archives as releases,” security researcher Antonis Terefos explained in an analysis published last week.
“This network not only distributes malware but also provides various other activities that make these ‘Ghost’ accounts appear as normal users, lending fake legitimacy to their actions and the associated repositories.”
Different categories of GitHub accounts are responsible for distinct aspects of the scheme in an attempt to make their infrastructure more resilient to takedown efforts by GitHub when malicious payloads are flagged on the platform.
These include accounts that serve the phishing repository template, accounts providing the image for the phishing template, and accounts that push malware to the repositories in the form of a password-protected archive masquerading as cracked software and game cheats.
Should the third set of accounts be detected and banned by GitHub, Stargazer Goblin moves to update the first account’s phishing repository with a new link to a new active malicious release, thereby allowing the operators to move forward with minimal disruption.
Besides liking new releases from multiple repositories and committing changes to the README.md files to modify the download links, there is evidence to suggest that some accounts part of the network have been previously compromised, with the credentials likely obtained via stealer malware.
“Most of the time, we observe that Repository and Stargazer accounts remain unaffected by bans and repository takedowns, whereas Commit and Release accounts are typically banned once their malicious repositories are detected,” Terefos said.
“It’s common to find Link-Repositories containing links to banned Release-Repositories. When this occurs, the Commit account associated with the Link-Repository updates the malicious link with a new one.”
One of the campaigns discovered by Check Point involves the use of a malicious link to a GitHub repository that, in turn, points to a PHP script hosted on a WordPress site and delivers an HTML Application (HTA) file to ultimately execute Atlantida Stealer by means of a PowerShell script.
Other malware families propagated via the DaaS are Lumma Stealer, RedLine Stealer, Rhadamanthys, and RisePro. Check Point further noted that the GitHub accounts are part of a larger DaaS solution that operates similar ghost accounts on other platforms such as Discord, Facebook, Instagram, X, and YouTube.
“Stargazer Goblin created an extremely sophisticated malware distribution operation that avoids detection as GitHub is considered a legitimate website, bypasses suspicions of malicious activities, and minimizes and recovers any damage when GitHub disrupts their network,” Terefos said.
“Utilizing multiple accounts and profiles performing different activities from starring to hosting the repository, committing the phishing template, and hosting malicious releases, enables the Stargazers Ghost Network to minimize their losses when GitHub performs any actions to disturb their operations as usually only one part of the whole operation is disrupted instead of all the involved accounts.”
The development comes as unknown threat actors are targeting GitHub repositories, wiping their contents, and asking the victims to reach out to a user named Gitloker on Telegram as part of a new extortion operation that has been ongoing since February 2024.
The social engineering attack targets developers with phishing emails sent from “[email protected],” aiming to trick them into clicking on bogus links under the guise of a job opportunity at GitHub, following which they are prompted to authorize a new OAuth app that erases all the repositories and demands a payment in exchange for restoring access.
It also follows an advisory from Truffle Security that it’s possible to access sensitive data from deleted forks, deleted repositories, and even private repositories on GitHub, urging organizations to take steps to secure against what it’s calling a Cross Fork Object Reference (CFOR) vulnerability.
“A CFOR vulnerability occurs when one repository fork can access sensitive data from another fork (including data from private and deleted forks),” Joe Leon said. “Similar to an Insecure Direct Object Reference, in CFOR users supply commit hashes to directly access commit data that otherwise would not be visible to them.”
In other words, a piece of code committed to a public repository may be accessible forever as long as there exists at least one fork of that repository. On top of that, it could also be used to access code committed between the time an internal fork is created and the repository is made public.
It’s however worth noting that these are intentional design decisions taken by GitHub, as noted by the company in its own documentation –
Commits to any repository in a fork network can be accessed from any repository in the same fork network, including the upstream repository
When you change a private repository to public, all the commits in that repository, including any commits made in the repositories it was forked into, will be visible to everyone.
“The average user views the separation of private and public repositories as a security boundary, and understandably believes that any data located in a private repository cannot be accessed by public users,” Leon said.
“Unfortunately, […] that is not always true. What’s more, the act of deletion implies the destruction of data. As we saw above, deleting a repository or fork does not mean your commit data is actually deleted.”
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