Summary
A cyberattack forced New Mexico's only Level I trauma center to divert ambulances and cancel outpatient surgeries. The ransomware group's claims and the hospital's own assessment told very different stories.
Key points
- UNM Hospital runs New Mexico's only Level I trauma center; ambulance traffic was diverted for about two hours on October 26.
- Outpatient surgeries and appointments were suspended for the day, and critical systems were reported back online the following afternoon.
- The Byod ransomware group claimed 36,000 compromised systems; UNM's assessment said core systems and servers were not penetrated.
- Attacker claims are a pressure tactic, not a forensic report.
- Decisions such as diverting ambulances belong to business and clinical leadership, and they need to be rehearsed in advance.
If your systems went dark at 8 a.m., who would decide what happens next?
On Monday, October 26, 2026, the University of New Mexico Health System began diverting ambulances, limiting new admissions and suspending outpatient surgeries after a cyberattack. UNM Hospital runs the state’s only Level I trauma center, so even a short diversion narrowed emergency options for the most severely injured patients in New Mexico. (The Record)
Ambulance traffic was diverted for about two hours to other hospitals in Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Employees were reportedly told to shut down and unplug desktops and disconnect mobile devices from hospital Wi-Fi. By the following afternoon, UNM reported that critical systems were back online and clinics had resumed scheduled care. (Medical Daily)
Two Very Different Stories
A new ransomware group calling itself Byod claimed responsibility. It said it had compromised 36,000 systems across the hospital and main campus, including Active Directory and the entire Microsoft Entra tenant, and stolen patient, student and employee data. (BleepingComputer)
UNM’s own assessment was narrower. Health system officials said the attack affected end-user devices and did not penetrate core systems or servers, and that they had made no concessions to the attackers. (EMS1)
Byod also made unusual public offers, including free decryption keys for healthcare devices, while saying it would keep the stolen data.
Lesson One: Attacker Claims Are a Pressure Tactic
Ransomware groups exaggerate. A dramatic claim on a leak site is designed to create panic among executives, regulators, patients and the press, and panic increases the chance of payment. It is not a forensic report.
That does not mean claims should be ignored. They should be investigated. But response decisions, public statements and negotiations should rest on what the organization’s own investigation shows. That requires logging, endpoint visibility and forensic capability that are in place before the incident, not procured during it.
Lesson Two: Hour-One Decisions Are Business Decisions
The most consequential decisions UNM faced in the first hours were not technical. Diverting ambulances, canceling surgeries, telling staff to unplug computers and closing classes are operational and clinical calls with direct effects on patients, students and revenue.
In many organizations, the incident response plan describes what IT will do and says very little about who has authority to make these calls, what thresholds trigger them and who needs to be informed. When that is unclear, decisions get delayed or made by whoever happens to be in the room.
Questions Every Leadership Team Should Be Able to Answer
- Who has authority to take systems offline, divert services or halt operations, and who is their backup when they are unreachable?
- What depends on what? Which critical services rely on which systems, and what are the manual fallback procedures if those systems are unavailable?
- What are the triggers? At what point does a cyber event escalate from an IT matter to an executive and board matter?
- Who speaks publicly, and how will the organization respond if an attacker publishes claims that do not match the facts?
- Have you practiced it? A plan that has never been exercised with business leaders in the room is a document, not a capability.
Healthcare makes these stakes obvious, but the same questions apply to manufacturers, utilities, financial firms and any organization whose operations stop when systems do.
Rehearse Before It Is Real
Cyber Defense Advisors runs incident response testing and tabletop exercises that put executives and operational leaders through realistic scenarios, and our CyberResponse offering helps organizations prepare to respond when an incident happens. Schedule a conversation to test your hour-one decisions.