Cyber Threat Trends

MFA Approved, Session Stolen: The Calendar Invite Phishing Campaign

Summary

Since mid-August, a phishing operation has been stealing live Google sessions from corporate users through Google Calendar invites. Victims used the real sign-in page and approved the real MFA prompt. The attacker relayed every code as it arrived.

Key points

  • Lures arrived as Google Calendar invites, often from organizations the victim already corresponded with, using routine themes such as voicemail notices, RFP requests and missed payments.
  • Links passed through Google's own redirector, so reputation checks came back clean.
  • A live reverse proxy relayed passwords, SMS codes, authenticator codes and number matching to Google, then captured the signed-in session.
  • The phishing kit already contains an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch.
  • Material Security's benchmark: be able to revoke sessions, contain OAuth grants and reset an account within an hour.

Multi-factor authentication did not stop this attack. It was part of it.

Since mid-August 2026, a phishing operation has been stealing live Google sessions from corporate users, according to research from Material Security’s Threat Research team. The campaign used a simple but effective delivery method: Google Calendar invites. (BleepingComputer)

Boring on Purpose

The invites often came from an organization the recipient already did business with, sent from accounts the attacker had compromised. The themes were deliberately routine: voicemail notifications, RFP and RFI requests, court summonses and missed payment notices. Nothing about them would stand out in a busy inbox or calendar.

The links went through Google’s own URL redirector, and later waves used Google share links and Drive file links. To a reputation-based filter, a link to google.com looks clean.

The Real Sign-In Page, the Real Prompt

Behind the redirect sat a live reverse proxy in front of the genuine Google sign-in page. The victim saw the real page, entered a real password and received a real MFA prompt. The proxy relayed each step to Google as it happened, including SMS codes, authenticator codes, number matching and phone-based recovery, and the operator walked away with the authenticated session.

Material attributes the activity to a phishing kit called Nyasher. The researchers also found unfinished Microsoft 365 code shipped alongside the working Google code. It is not switched on, but adding that brand would take little more than dropping in a file.

The campaign was also built to avoid inspection. Pages were assembled in the browser rather than hosted as static sites, a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge sat in front of them, and lure domains were often registered days before use.

What a Hijacked Session Reaches

A stolen session is not just a stolen password. It is the user, already signed in. That typically means mail, Drive, shared documents and the ability to approve OAuth grants for third-party apps, which can provide persistence even after a password reset.

Through its disruption effort, which it calls Operation CloudFire, Material reports taking down 897 domains and blocking more than 68,000 campaign messages over one month. Activity has since shifted toward Drive share invites, and Material expects the operator to pivot again.

MFA Is a Starting Line, Not a Finish Line

The lesson is not that MFA is useless. It is that MFA proves who started a session, not who is using it now. Organizations need controls on both sides of the login:

  • Move to phishing-resistant authentication such as passkeys or hardware security keys for administrators and high-risk users first. These methods are bound to the legitimate site and cannot be relayed through a proxy the way codes and push approvals can.
  • Treat calendar invites as a threat surface. Review settings that automatically add external invites to calendars, and make sure reported phishing is removed from calendars as well as inboxes.
  • Monitor for session anomalies such as sign-ins from unexpected infrastructure, impossible travel and new devices appearing mid-session.
  • Restrict OAuth grants so users cannot approve high-risk third-party apps without review.
  • Practice the response. Material’s benchmark is the right one: be able to revoke sessions, contain OAuth grants and reset the affected account within an hour.
  • Train for the scenario. Awareness training that only covers obvious fake login pages misses this campaign entirely. Users need to know that a familiar sender and a real Google page are not proof of safety.

If one of your people approved that prompt today, how long before anyone noticed? For many organizations, the honest answer is measured in days.

Test Your People and Your Response

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